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Abstract Where ethical or regulatory questions arise
about an individual’s interests in accessing
bioinformation about herself (such as findings from
screening or health research), the value of this informa-
tion has traditionally been construed in terms of its
clinical utility. It is increasingly argued, however, that
the Bpersonal utility^ of findings should also be taken
into account. This article characterizes one particular
aspect of personal utility: that derived from the role of
personal bioinformation in identity construction. The
suggestion that some kinds of information are relevant
to identity is not in itself new. However, the account
outlined here seeks to advance the debate by proposing a
conception of the relationship between bioinformation
and identity that does not depend on essentialist assump-
tions and applies beyond the narrow genetic contexts in
which identity is customarily invoked. The proposal is
that the identity-value of personal bioinformation may
be understood in terms of its instrumental role in the
construction of our narrative identities, specifically that
its value lies in helping us to develop self-narratives that
support us in navigating our embodied existences. I
argue that this narrative conception provides useful in-
sights that are pertinent to the ethical governance of
personal bioinformation. It illuminates a wider range
of ethical considerations in relation to information ac-
cess; it accounts for variations in the utility of different
kinds of information; and it highlights that the context in
which information is conveyed can be as important as
whether it is disclosed at all. These arguments are illus-
trated using an example drawn from psychiatric neuro-
imaging research.
Keywords Access to information . Biodata . Genetic
origins . Narrative identity . Personal utility . Psychiatric
neuroimaging
Introduction: Characterizing a Species of Personal
Utility
This paper considers the nature of individuals’ interests
in accessing Bbiological^ information about themselves
of the kind that is generated in healthcare, health-related
research, screening, or testing services. This includes
information about an individual’s past or present phys-
ical or mental health, and possible future health risks,
and also extends beyond health, for example, to her
bodily constitution and functions, reproductive or cog-
nitive capacities, and biological relationships to others,
including genetic relatedness or shared traits. For the
purpose of this discussion these will be collectively
termed Bpersonal bioinformation,^ signalling that they
tell an individual something about herself, though this is
not intended to preclude the shared nature of much of
this information or others’ legitimate interests in it.
Practical guidance governing the disclosure of this
kind of information to patients or participants in
healthcare and health research contexts tends to focus
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on its clinical utility; that is, whether the information is
sufficiently analytically robust and relevant to the indi-
vidual to permit her, or her clinician, to make meaning-
ful, actionable decisions about her health and care. For
example, the precision of tests and availability of effec-
tive interventions underlie the U.K. guidelines
governing the provision of screening programmes
(Public Health England 2015), and the clinical signifi-
cance of incidental findings has been a central consid-
eration in U.K. Biobank’s deliberations about the ethics
of providing participants with feedback from its new
programme collecting imaging data (U.K. Biobank
Ethics and Governance Council 2013, 8). However, it
is increasingly common in the academic literature, es-
pecially that offering recommendations for ethical prac-
tice in genetic research or the regulation of genomic
testing services, to encounter suggestions that there
may be justification for taking into account the
Bpersonal utility^ or Bpersonal meaning^ of findings in
determining policies for their disclosure (Bunnik,
Janssens, and Schermer 2015; Fabsitz et al. 2010;
Khoury et al. 2010; Wolf et al. 2012). What is less clear,
however, is precisely what the nature of personal utility
is and why it is worth taking seriously.
Personal utility (if defined at all) is often character-
ized negatively and as something of a runner-up, apply-
ing to information which, though not directly clinically
actionable, might nonetheless serve broader health or
well-being ends, for example by encouraging protective
behaviour change or helping to prepare one for future
health impacts (Bunnik, Janssens, and Schermer 2015;
Daack‐Hirsch et al. 2013; Foster, Mulvihill, and Sharp
2009). The purpose of this article is to propose and
illustrate a means of conceptualizing one particular spe-
cies of the personal utility of bioinformation: its poten-
tial value in an individual’s construction of her own
identity. This conception is not intended to be exhaus-
tive of all dimensions of personal utility. However, the
aim is to provide a less negatively defined account of the
personal value of some bioinformation and to explain
why this can be seen as engaging information subjects’
interests in ways sufficiently significant to warrant at-
tention in the ethical governance of their access to this
information. Distinguishing it from some presentations
of personal utility, identity-value is not framed here as
an (inferior) alternative to clinical utility, but as a poten-
tially important parallel consideration, and one that is
not reducible merely to facilitating its subject-recipients’
autonomous choices about softer health matters.
The suggestion that particular kinds of personal
bioinformation could be relevant to identity is not in
itself new. For example, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) has recognized an individual’s Bright to
know their [genetic] origins,^ explicitly on identity
grounds, under the Article 8 right to respect for private
life (Odièvre v France 13 February 2003, [45]).
Commercial direct-to-consumer (DTC) genomic testing
services frequently appeal to potential customers’ inter-
ests in their identities when marketing their services,
including supposed Bancestry tracing^ analysis
(Nordgren and Juengst 2009). Meanwhile, several aca-
demic commentaries examine, often from a critical per-
spective, the perceived significance of genetic or geno-
mic findings and biometrics to identity (Ajana 2010;
Hauskeller 2006; Hauskeller, Sturdy, and Tutton 2013;
McGowan, Fishman, and Lambrix 2010; Nordgren and
Juengst 2009).
However, the accounts of the connection between
information and identity given in these contexts may
be seen as displaying some, if not in every case all, of a
number of limitations. First, the precise nature of the
role that bioinformation plays in identity often remains
opaque, sometimes compounded by ambiguity about
which sense of the multifaceted concept of identity is
being invoked. For example, the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR displays some slippage between concerns asso-
ciated with the (re)identification of numerically identical
individuals and those associated with identity under-
stood in the sense of self-characterization.1 Secondly,
we might question the apparently exceptionalist, or at
least narrow, focus on genetic or genomic information.
Thirdly, these existing accounts may themselves express
(or else voice concerns about others expressing) a
1 Concerns about numerical identity relate to questions about what
determines whether someone or something is one and the same
person or entity. When applied to people, these concerns often
manifest in questions about the criteria necessary to identify some-
one as (remaining) the same individual, perhaps despite qualitative
changes. Marya Schechtman, amongst others, has argued that it is
a mistake to conflate questions about re-identification with those
about self-characterization, which are instead concerned with the
characteristics that make someone the kind of individual she is
(Schechtman 1996). One example of an instance in which these
two sense of identity are invoked may be seen in the ECtHR’s
judgment in Daróczy v Hungary (1 July 2008) concerning the
applicant’s interests in retaining the name by which she had been
known throughout her married life. The judgment shifts between
issues relating to the utility of a name as a means of (numerical)
identification for administrative purposes and the role of some-
one’s name in her own self-definition.
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contended bio-essentialist idea of identity (Hauskeller
2006; Marshall 2009; Nordgren and Juengst 2009).
Here my intention is to offer a means of conceptual-
izing and clarifying one particular kind of relationship
between personal bioinformation and identity in order to
address these limitations. The proposal is that a useful
way of understanding this relationship is by coming to
see the former as one of the tools that an individual
might use to constitute the latter through the construc-
tion of her own self-narrative. I wish to suggest that this
conception not only permits us to recognize the rele-
vance to identity of a range of personal bioinformation
beyond the genetic, it also accounts for the morally
significant role of this information in our lives, hence
our potentially considerable interests in accessing it.
Moreover, it does so without depending on a bio-
essentialist view of identity.
The following discussion will explore these claims
further. This will include consideration of features of
information that account for its identity-value, as well as
those that could undermine this. The final section will
consider the characteristics of informational transactions
that help to determine whether these contribute in a
constructive way to identity. Providing some means of
making these distinctions is important if the account
offered here is to be useful to practical questions
concerning the governance of access to personal
bioinformation. The conception of identity-value of-
fered below will be instructive in contemporary deliber-
ations about information subjects’ interests in a number
of fields inwhich the generation of bioinformation could
pose fresh challenges. These include biobanking and
DTC genomic testing, as well as prospective and emerg-
ing fields such as in DTC neuroimaging services, diag-
nostic uses of implanted neurodevices, fetal genome
testing, and current policy debates about what someone
born following mitochondrial transfer should be told
about their mitochondrial donor (Department of Health
2014, [2.23]).
A Narrative Conception of Identity
Before proceeding to an example that illustrates the
potential role of bioinformation in identity construction,
it will be useful to say something about the narrative
conception of identity underlying this. This will neces-
sarily only be a brief sketch of a rich vein of
philosophical thinking but will highlight the main
features that inform the assertions made below.
The narrative view of personal identity on which the
discussion here is based owes much to that developed
by Marya Schechtman in The Constitution of Selves
(1996), though related accounts may be found in the
philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor,
amongst others (MacIntyre 1985; Taylor 1989).2 The
narrative conception of identity addresses what
Schechtman terms Bthe characterization question^ of
what makes someone the individual she is (1996, 73).
The answer to this question, Schechtman argues, is that
identity (in this sense) is constituted by a self-narrative
that each of us constructs, albeit not in isolation but as
part of, and shaped by, a life lived amongst others.
In suggesting here that we might usefully construe
the role of bioinformation in identity in terms of provid-
ing a tool of narrative self-construction, the intention is
not to deny that bioinformation could also be relevant to
quite different numerical or taxonomic identity ques-
tions, such as those concerned with distinguishing or
reidentifying discrete individuals, or establishing spe-
cies boundaries (Hauskeller 2006). However, while the
concern is with the personal utility of bioinformation, it
is identity in the sense of self-characterization or self-
conception as described by Schechtman that is most
pertinent. This is because, according to this view, it is
by reference to our self-narratives that we address ques-
tions about our self-interested concerns, such as whether
we continue to exist as the same person, with enduring
commitments and values, over time. Our self-narratives
are the frameworks through which we filter and interpret
our experiences. And it is by being integrated into our
narratives that elements of our lives—for example, our
motives and characteristics—count as ours. Our narra-
tives are thus the means by which we make sense of our
lives, and they help to determine those actions for which
we are responsible (Schechtman 1996). It should be
plain from this that being in a position to construct such
a narrative has crucial normative consequences for the
quality of our lives and our moral agency.
2 Other philosophers who are closely associated with somewhat
different narrative accounts of selfhood include Paul Ricoeur
(1992) and Daniel Dennett (1991). Narrative theories of identity
are not limited to philosophical inquiry, but extend also into
sociology (Giddens 1991) and psychology (Gergen and Gergen
1988).
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On Schechtman’s account, the construction of one’s
narrative not only entails these normative consequences,
but also normative conditions on which they depend.
These she terms the Barticulation^ and Breality^ con-
straints (1996, 114 and 119). These constraints mean
that, although it is not supposed or required that we
literally or perpetually relate our own self-stories, they
must at least be relatable and intelligible to ourselves
and to others. This requires, inter alia, that our narratives
are both internally coherent (articulable) and broadly
consistent with (the reality of) the world as experienced
by others. Being in a position to construct an intelligible,
coherent and realistic self-narrative, therefore, really
matters as part of the richness of a fulfilling human
existence. The proposal I wish to illustrate and defend
here is that inmany, if not all, circumstances, knowledge
of our bodies, health, or biological relationships to
others can make a sufficiently important contribution
to our capacity to construct our own narrative identities,
such that our access to the kinds of personal
bioinformation that supply this knowledge also acquires
ethical significance. And this significance is distinguish-
able from, and not reducible to, any clinical utility it may
or may not have.
This, however, is where the proposal to be advanced
here departs somewhat from accounts such as
Schechtman’s. Her own account enumerates the constit-
uents of self-narrative in terms of Btraits, actions,
experiences^ and Bcharacteristics^ (Schechtman 1996,
77 and 94). While she does not explicitly preclude the
incorporation of biological traits or experiences into
self-narrative, neither does she acknowledge their pos-
sible role. Indeed, she seems to relegate the identity-
relevance of the human body merely to the means by
which others may (re)identify us, thus permitting the
kinds of social interactions that contribute to self-
building (Schechtman 1996). I wish to suggest that
insights into and understanding of our biological selves
in fact play a key role in our identities, and thus infor-
mation that supports this is potentially of great value.
This proposal might seem to commit a category
mistake because our bodily states, functions, or relation-
ships are only Bours^ in a passive, default sense, not
because they are woven into our personal stories.
Schechtman herself lodges this kind of objection when
she observes that findings about the neurological corre-
lates of behaviour should not be seen as threatening our
own narrative explanations of our motivations, because
these neuroscientific findings have no claim on being
Bprenarrative truth about the self^ (Schechtman
2012, 75). The argument to be developed in this article,
however, has no quarrel with this. It is not premised on
the assumption that personal bioinformation reveals
existing facts about an individual’s identity, but rather
that it supplies knowledge of her biology or health
which she may then judge to be relevant (or not) and
choose to use (or not) in thinking about who she is and
in developing her self-narrative accordingly.
Bioinformation should, therefore, be seen as being valu-
able to identity in an instrumental rather than intrinsic
sense. As I shall argue further below, this value is
attributable to the fact that our narratives must, if they
are to fulfil their normative interpretive and
sense-making roles, reflect the inescapably materially
embodied nature of human existence. The somewhat
dualist perspective reflected in Schechtman’s account,
in which self-constitution takes place in the mind, while
the body is just a vehicle through which identity is
enacted or located, seems strikingly to underplay the
centrality of embodiment in our lives.3 The next section
will provide a concrete example in order to illustrate the
significance of this omission.
An Example From Psychiatric Neuroimaging
Research
Psychiatric neuroimaging research provides an illustra-
tion of one context in which potentially personally sig-
nificant bioinformation is generated. This field of re-
search analyses neuroimaging data gathered from par-
ticipants to examine possible correlations between struc-
tural or functional brain features and outcomes of po-
tential psychiatric interest, including diagnosis of disor-
ders such as depression or schizophrenia, prediction of
risk of illness, or responsiveness to treatment (Cooper
et al. 2013). The example of psychiatric neuroimaging
has been chosen here because it is a technology widely
anticipated to be on the cusp of producing robust diag-
nostic or predictive findings relevant to individuals, yet
3 CatrionaMackenzie has made a similar critique of Schechtman’s
lack of acknowledgement of the importance of our embodiment in
her conception of narrative self-constitution, though without the
aim of emphasizing the consequent role of bioinformation in this
(Mackenzie 2009). Schechtman, however, is not alone in present-
ing a disembodied conception of narrative identity; Anthony
Giddens’s account is subject to similar charges (see, for example,
Witz 2000).
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it is also still subject to considerable doubts about its
current capacities to provide reliable insights into our
mental health (ibid). These features makes it useful for
illustrating the potential for a field of biomedical re-
search to generate rich and useful narrative tools, while
also helping to demonstrate the ways in which the
epistemic limitations of a technology like neuroimaging
could significantly detract from this potential. That is, it
captures both sides of the coin in respect of the ways in
which the identity-value of personal bioinformation is
contingent upon its strengths as a source of knowledge
of our bodies, health, and biological relationships.
One example of recent psychiatric neuroimaging re-
search is a study conducted with relatives of people with
heritable bipolar disorder by the Division of Psychiatry
at the University of Edinburgh, with the aim of investi-
gating whether activation differences are evident in the
brains of at-risk individuals prior to the onset of illness
(Whalley et al. 2013).4 This study involved analysis of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data
from ninety-eight individuals known to be at genetic
risk of developing such a disorder, and a control group
of a further fifty-eight participants.5 At the start of the
study none of the participants was diagnosed as having a
mood disorder. At the time of the two year follow-up
twenty of the at-risk participants had developed a major
depressive disorder.
At the start of the study, all participants underwent an
fMRI scan to capture data about their patterns of brain
activation while they performed language processing
exercises. The high-risk individuals who went on to
develop a depressive disorder exhibited increased acti-
vation in a particular region of the brain (the bilateral
insula cortex). This abnormal activation was not widely
observed in either the high-risk individuals who
remained well two years later, nor in the healthy control
group. This supported the researchers’ hypothesis that
the brains of those participants who developed a mood
disorder would exhibit activation differences in the re-
gions associated with depressive disorders. However,
the incidence of false positives (findings of abnormal
activation in participants who remained well at the two
year follow-up) was around 25 per cent—the relevance
of this to the identity-value of individual results will be
considered further below. The researchers posited that
their findings provided evidence of a possible predictive
biomarker for mood disorder in those already at genetic
risk, the clinical application of which warrants future
research.
The study described here is intended to provide a
concrete illustration to anchor further discussion; the
implication is not that its findings exhibit unequivocal,
unique, or exceptional identity relevance. Indeed one
reason for choosing this (rather than more thoroughly
traversed categories of bioinformation—such as those
relating to genetic parentage (Kirkman 2003; Nuffield
Council on Bioethics 2013; Ravelingien, Provoost, and
Pennings 2015; Wilson 1997) or genetic disease risk
(the potential identity relevance of which is widely
discussed, if contested) (Hauskeller 2006; McGowan,
Fishman, and Lambrix 2010; Nordgren and Juengst
2009) is to demonstrate that the arguments presented
here are generalizable to a broader range of personal
bioinformation. It is, however, also an interesting exam-
ple in its own right. Unlike some other kinds of neuro-
imaging research, studies in this field can in principle
produce results pertaining to individual participants,
rather than just aggregate findings (Cooper et al.
2013). Psychiatric neuroimaging research represents a
busy field in which there is considerable, if not univer-
sal, enthusiasm about the possibilities of clinical trans-
lation of its findings (Farah and Gillihan 2012; Kapur,
Phillips, and Insel 2012; Reilly and McGuire 2013). As
more studies are conducted, ethical and practical ques-
tions about whether participants’ interests in accessing
individual results extend beyond clinical utility, which
are increasingly being asked in other research fields, will
only become more pressing. It is timely now, before
predictive or diagnostic tests using neuroimaging reach
the clinic, to interrogate any possible identity-related
implications of disclosing test results that should be
considered alongside their potential clinical utility.
These implications include not only potentially con-
structive contributions, but also circumstances in which
disclosure could be detrimental or simply not useful.
In the study described above, participants were in-
formed that clinically significant incidental findings of
structural brain abnormalities would be disclosed to
their GPs (Division of Psychiatry, The University of
Edinburgh 2008). However, there was no parallel policy
4 First-degree relatives of individuals with bipolar disorder are
more than ten times more likely to develop bipolar disorder, and
are three times more likely to develop a major depressive disorder,
than the general population (Whalley et al. 2013)
5 fMRI is a non-invasive imaging technique that provides an
indirect measure of brain activity relative to particular experimen-
tal tasks by detecting changing flows of oxygenated blood in
regions of the brain.
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to return the intended research results to participants,
even if these were to provide probabilistic predictions or
hypothesized explanation of their increased susceptibil-
ity to serious depressive disorders. This is noted here not
to prejudge the appropriateness of such a policy but
because it at least warrants some further examination
from the perspective of inquiring whether such results
could be valuable to participants on grounds of their
identity-relevance. In order to address this question, the
following paragraphs will first suggest several ways in
which findings from a psychiatric neuroimaging study
such as that described above could contribute construc-
tively to the development of the subject-and-recipient’s
self-narrative. Some ways in which this information
might have less positive impacts on identity will also
be reviewed. These inferences are based upon empirical
literature reporting attitudes of patients, healthy individ-
uals, and clinicians to (often hypothetical) scenarios in
which predictions or diagnoses of mental illness are
made or confirmed using neuroimaging data, as well
as to other kinds of biologically-based explanations of
cognitive or psychiatric disorders. Not all of these ac-
counts make explicit references to identity, let alone
self-narrative. Here I attempt to draw out how the atti-
tudes reported might be relevant to narrative
self-constitution.
For simplicity, the discussion in the next few par-
agraphs will assess possible positive and negative
impacts on identity as if the findings from the study
just described provide robust predictive or diagnostic
information and therefore it would not be unreason-
able for individual participants to treat them as reli-
able sources of knowledge about their (future) mental
health. However, in reality, it is probably too soon to
assume that research findings in the field of psychi-
atric neuroimaging are reliable in this way (Cooper
et al. 2013; Farah and Gillihan 2012; Reilly and
McGuire 2013). Moreover, the neurological basis of
psychiatric disorders is itself not uncontested (Ramos
2012). Therefore, following an initial assessment of
the kinds of features that constitute the identity-value
of bioinformation, I will turn to consider how doubts
about the capacity of psychiatric neuroimaging to
provide reliable predictive or diagnostic results for
individuals (or indeed about any bioinformation
facing similar epistemic challenges) might affect its
identity-value. First though, the following paragraphs
will provide illustrations of how and why receipt of
findings from a psychiatric neuroimaging study could
potentially, mutatis mutandis, contribute in signifi-
cant ways to an individual’s self-narrative.
On the basis of some accounts of experiences of
living with mental illness, we might anticipate that for
many recipients the most immediate identity-impact of
results indicating an elevated risk of serious psychiatric
illness would be fear that the onset of illness will be
accompanied by a Bloss of self^ (Wisdom et al. 2008).
However, receiving (reliable) information about one’s
increased risk of psychiatric illness could, as well as
heralding this threat, also be seen as offering a number
of ways of countering the feared loss of self. It might
provide the opportunity and encouragement to under-
take protective measures such as behaviour changes or
early interventions (where available and effective)
(Borgelt, Buchman, and Illes 2011; Buchman et al.
2013; Gilbody, Sheldon, and House 2008; Marshall
and Rathbone 2011). Just because these measures aim
at improved health outcomes does not mean that the
ends thus served are solely health-related. Without con-
ceding a neuro-essentialist view of identity, we may still
recognize the particularly intimate connections between
a well-functioning brain, someone’s subjective experi-
ences, and the integrity of her sense of self (Gillet 2008).
The prevention of symptoms of serious mental health
disorders may, therefore, itself be viewed as intimately
connected to the protection of an individual’s relation-
ship to her own self-narrative and identity.
Predictive findings could also serve a preparatory
function by helping the subject-recipient to develop a
revised self-narrative that supports her in making sense
of and remaining resilient when confronted with the
threat or onset of symptoms of mental illness. Carlos
Novas, Nikolas Rose, and Joelle Abi-Rached have the-
orized that one response to new kinds of knowledge that
biotechnologies such as genetic testing and neuroimag-
ing make available is the adoption of a Bsomatic
individuality,^ which is characterized by awareness of
being Bat risk^ (Novas and Rose 2001, 485 and 488;
Rose 2007; Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). This mode of
self-identification is presented as an empowering one in
which the individual assumes responsibility for deci-
sions about her health and her body by, for example,
availing herself of the knowledge and opportunities to
undertake preventative or therapeutic measures.
There are also indications from some studies that
receiving an explanation of mental illness based upon
neuroimaging findings could provide reassuring, objec-
tive validation of patients’ experiences, one which
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proves that they are not Bjust crazy^ and lends
Blegitimacy and unarguability^ to their health status
(Buchman et al. 2013, 74; Cohn 2010) Even allowing
for warranted concerns about whether such views attribute
too much objectivity and authority to neuroimages,6 it
might still be recognized that giving someone the oppor-
tunity to explain her symptoms in neurological terms could
potentially support the development of a self-narrative that
permits her to make sense of her experiences of illness, or
even offer therapeutic benefits. For example, some
psychiatric research has suggested that constructing self-
narratives that incorporate acknowledgement of the reality
of illness could support insight and, thus, recovery in
patients with psychotic disorders (Roe and Davidson
2005; Wisdom et al. 2008).
In contrast to these suggestions of narrative accom-
modation, findings from psychiatric neuroimaging
could alternatively facilitate a helpful distancing of the
self from the disorder, in which the latter comes to be
seen just as a feature of one’s brain as part of one’s body
(Cohn 2010). One study suggests that one way in which
this externalization might be beneficial is in mitigating
patients’ sense of responsibility and self-blame for their
illness (Illes et al. 2008). I would suggest that this
separation of a psychiatric disorder from the self ought
not to be read as indicating the irrelevance of the neu-
rological findings to narrative construction. On the con-
trary, it seems reasonable to recognize that
bioinformation is no less identity-significant for facili-
tating an individual’s exclusion of particular modes of
biological self-definition from her narrative.
These indications of the potentially constructive role
of bioinformation in narrative development notwith-
standing, it is important to recognize that the same kind
of information could instead be detrimental to the recip-
ient’s sense of self. For example, one group of practi-
tioners asked about the hypothetical clinical use of pre-
dictive neuroimaging expressed concern that this could
disturb rather than empower patients’ sense of identity if
they came to equate a disordered brain with a disordered
self (Borgelt, Buchman, and Illes 2011). Indeed, we
might heed warnings from research that found that
simply informing participants that they carried a gene
associated with increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease
impacted negatively on both their own assessment of
their memory and performance in memory tests
(Lineweaver et al. 2013). Here bioinformation may still
be seen as a narrative tool, but one that leads recipients
to reinterpret who they are and their capacities in bio-
logically deterministic ways that potentially undermine
their wellbeing.
Negative identity impacts might equally arise from
interpreting findings in ways that distance the source of
psychiatric illness from the self. For example, one study
found that, alongside reducing burdensome feelings of
personal responsibility for depression, providing neuro-
chemical explanations for this illness can also have the
less desirable effects of increasing pessimism about
recovery and scepticism about the effectiveness of psy-
chosocial therapies (Deacon and Baird 2009). The irony
here is that it is these kinds of therapies (as contrasted
with psychopharmaceuticals) that Bwork on the self^
and might therefore better lend themselves to the con-
struction of therapeutic self-narratives (Rose and
Abi-Rached 2013, 220). Similarly, while we might as-
sume that biological explanations of psychiatric disor-
ders would reduce the stigma of mental illness and
associated ill-effects on self-conception, there is some
evidence that neuroimaging-based explanations of dis-
orders may make little difference to others’ attitudes
(Cohn 2010), or (extrapolating from work on genetic
explanations) could even exacerbate stigma if the disor-
ders are thereby seen as more serious or intractable
(Phelan 2005; Read 2007).
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that
it is not inevitable that all predictive neuroimaging find-
ings will be received in ways that are unequivocally
either beneficial or detrimental to the subject-recipient’s
self-conception. There are some indications that individ-
uals change their attitudes towards the identity-
significance of facts about their brains depending on
context or their current circumstances, or are simply
ambivalent about whether these tell them anything
about who they are (Dumit 2004; Pickersgill,
Cunningham-Burley, and Martin 2011).
Accounting for the Identity-Value of Personal
Bioinformation
The examples of the possible impacts, interpretations,
and uses of psychiatric neuroimaging findings outlined
in the previous section are intended to be illustrative of
6 The concern here is that patients might infer too much from the
apparent objectivity of neuroimages, which are not in fact literal
photographic representations of the brain depicting the location of
mental illness, but rather artefacts constructed from complex sta-
tistical analysis (Roskies 2008)
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the potential identity-significance of a wider range of
personal bioinformation. In order to demonstrate this it
will be useful to take stock of the kinds of narrative tools
that bioinformation could provide, building upon but
expanding beyond the specifics of psychiatric
neuroimaging.
One central aspect of narrative self-constitution is
that it provides the means of developing and thinking
aboutwhowe are and the kinds of characteristics, values
and commitments with which we choose to align our
identities. To this end, then, bioinformation may be seen
as providing a range of possible new or reconfigured
modes of self-description: fresh means by which the
recipient might classify herself (for example, as some-
one Bat risk^ or Ba survivor^ of a particular condition, or
as Bdonor conceived^) (Hacking 1986; Hacking 1995).
These descriptors might be freighted with particular
significance because of how they affect the place of
particular motivations, priorities or affiliations in our
own stories. For example, coming to thinking of our-
selves as Bat risk^ might lead us to give particular
priority to our responsibilities for our own health as part
of the commitments and projects that make up our
narratives (Novas and Rose 2001). Or they could pro-
vide the impetus for new associations and relationships
(perhaps with those with whom we share a disease risk
or our donor siblings) or for joint endeavours such as
patient activism, thus establishing fresh interdepen-
dences between our own narratives and those of others
(Gibbon 2007). Or they might simply supply new ways
of thinking about ourselves and some of the context and
filters through which we interpret and order our experi-
ences. None of this is to suggest, however, that any
particular individual is obliged to use bioinformation
in these ways. Crucially, on the account being developed
here, bioinformation is a narrative tool that may be used,
ignored, or reacted against, not a straightforward build-
ing block to be incorporated-as-given into one’s identity.
The receipt of personal bioinformation could just as well
support narrative developments that resist (re)definition
in biological terms (for example, by refusing to be
defined by one’s illness or one’s chromosomal sex).
However, according to the narrative-constituted ac-
count adopted here, identity is not just a random assem-
blage of selected self-descriptors. Our self-narratives
provide the interpretive frameworks through which we
make sense of who we are and our experiences and as
such, their intelligibility and articulability comprise key
normative features. Personal bioinformation, therefore,
can fulfil a further kind of role by providing the kinds of
explanations, connections or forewarnings that contrib-
ute to the intelligibility of our narratives, both in terms
of their internal coherence and in relation to our own
(and others’) experiences of the world . For example,
bioinformation could supply explanations that help to
fill (perhaps distressing) gaps or discrepancies between
an individual’s existing beliefs about who and how she
is and her subjective experiences; thereby permitting her
to construct a story about her self and her life that makes
sense of, and space for, these experiences. In a similar
way, the information might help to disabuse her of
unhelpful or misconceived interpretations of the causes
of her experiences. Where the onset of illness or other
physical or psychological changes have not yet im-
pinged on someone’s experiences, bioinformation could
also fulfil a pre-emptive role of an analogous kind,
permitting the individual to prepare and plan for the
changes to come and find ways to accommodate these
within her developing narrative. We can, for example,
imagine these roles being fulfilled by information about
one’s genetic parentage that explains why one’s hered-
itary traits differ from those of other family members
(Kirkman 2003), or by results from testing for genetic
cancer risk which provide the opportunity for one to
consider how this might impact on one’s identity as a
potential parent (d’Agincourt-Canning 2006), as much
as by indicators of mental health risk that could help one
to make sense of the onset of affective or cognitive
changes. Again, however, it is important not to overlook
the possibility that bioinformation might not contribute
to someone’s narrative in ways that she experiences as
welcome or constructive. For example, this might be the
case where findings are rendered only in probabilistic
terms that only serve to increase uncertainty, or if they
conflict with someone’s existing modes of self-
understanding or the account of herself she sees
projected in her future. I shall return to consider circum-
stances in which bioinformation might not be useful for
identity formation further in the next section, but first
there is a further step to be made in understanding this
value itself. I wish to look beyond specific instances of
the ways in which bioinformation might contribute to
self-narrative, to examine the underlying explanation for
the identity-value that these instances have in common.
When described in the less technology-specific terms
above, it becomes possible to see how the instrumental
role(s) of bioinformation in identity construction plays
out beyond psychiatric neuroimaging findings, and how,
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for example, results from genomic screening, tests for
specific disease risks, individual findings (anticipated or
incidental) from health research, or information about
one’s genetic origins might similarly provide useful
narrative tools. The question remains, however, why
having the opportunity to use personal bioinformation
in the construction of one’s self-narrative is sufficiently
important to warrant ethical attention. The answer to
this, I wish to suggest, comprises two steps briefly
introduced above. The first of these is that, on an ac-
count of narrat ive self-consti tut ion such as
Schechtman’s, being in a position to develop an intelli-
gible and realistic self-narrative is a condition for
achieving that which is valuable in an identity thus
consti tuted. The second step diverges from
Schechtman’s own account, because it rests on the as-
sertion that the kinds of insights and understanding that
individuals can derive from receipt of personal
bioinformation contribute in an important way to secur-
ing this condition because of the inescapably materially
embodied nature of our existence.
By the Bembodied nature of existence^ I mean that
our biology and bodies exert what Stacy Alaimo and
Susan Hekman characterize as Bactive^ and
Brecalcitrant^ forces upon our lives that serve to shape,
enable, and place limits both on the nature of our expe-
riences and on our capacities to define ourselves
(Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 3–4). Examples such as
pain, illness, and (dis)ability might come most readily
to mind here, but our reproductive, cognitive, and affec-
tive capacities as well as the functioning of our auto-
nomic systems, the observable markers of our social
identities, and our biological relationships to others will
also play a role. As Ian Hacking observes, however
strongly inclined we are to the idea that we invent
ourselves, we must recognize that we do so while
Bpush[ing] our lives through a thicket in which the stern
trunks of determinism are entangled in the twisting vines
of chance^ (Hacking 2004, 282). We do not need to
follow Hacking in his language of determinism for his
metaphor to remain apt. In pursuit of defining who we
are, we will inevitably bump up against the realities and
constraints of our material, biological selves. The sugges-
tion I wish to make is that, by fulfilling the kinds of
explanatory, preparatory, self-descriptive, or relation-
building roles described above, personal bioinformation
supplies us with the means to construct self-narratives
that help us to negotiate some, though probably not all, of
our recalcitrant materiality. It alerts us to the whereabouts
of some of the Bstern trunks^ and Btwisting vines^ and
thus to live out identities that support us in anticipating
their impact, embracing them, or navigating around them.
The assertion here, then, is not merely that it is
satisfying or interesting if our self-stories include plot-
lines that involve features of our embodied state or even
that they are really likely to do so because those features
are prevalent in our lived experience, but the stronger
claim that the incorporation of these is key to meeting
the conditions of articulation and reality that
Schechtman imposes on a robust identity-constituting
narrative. Thus access to the kinds of information that
facilitate the construction of these plotlines could be key
to realizing the value inherent in developing and under-
standing and enacting who we are. Given that we lead
inescapably embodied lives, a narrative that is devel-
oped with knowledge of, and insight into, our own
biology and health will be one that makes sense to
ourselves and to others when confronted with the reality
and vagaries of our materially embodied existence. It
will also be one that, in turn, helps us to interpret and
make sense of this reality and to negotiate the experi-
ences with which it presents us. In doing so, personal
bioinformation will contribute to the construction of a
rich and intelligible self-narrative of a kind that retains
its integrity, supports our enduring values and commit-
ments, underpins our moral agency, and supplies inter-
pretive perspective on the world and thus comprises an
important part of a full and flourishing existence. This
accounts for what, I wish to argue, is our ethically
considerable interest in (at least being given the option
of) accessing this information.
One important part of the value of a self-narrative
constructed in the light of knowledge of one’s embodied
existence derives from the intimate connection between
such a narrative and personal autonomy, where autono-
my is understood as the capacity for critical reflection
upon and evaluation of one’s motives (Dworkin 1988).
An individual may be seen as exercising this capacity in
her assessment and selection of the elements fromwhich
she constructs her own narrative. Moreover, and more
fundamentally, this self-narrative in turn supplies the
source of the considered desires, beliefs, and values that
provide motivations for an individual’s autonomous
actions—those actions that are in Schechtman’s terms
Bquite solidly hers^—and in which, on many concep-
tions, autonomy itself is rooted (Schechtman 1996, 81;
Dworkin 1988; Watson 2003). Beliefs about our bodies,
health, and biological relationships, insofar as they
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supply the basis for the many of our personal projects,
values, and interpersonal commitments are likely to
supply much of the material of autonomy thus con-
ceived. Furthermore, a self-narrative informed by
knowledge of our biological selves may help to provide
some of the foundation for, and critical perspective
upon, a system of considered motives that maintains
their integrity and coherence when confronted with the
realities of embodied existence. It might be objected
here that narrative strands derived from personal
bioinformation are, on the contrary, antithetical to
autonomy, originating as they do in biological factors
that are externally imposed rather than reflected upon
and chosen. However, as John Christman (2001) ob-
serves, while we may be heteronomous with respect to
those aspects of our physical selves from which we feel
alienated, a conception of autonomy that requires total
substantive independence from our biology and physi-
cality not only sets an unfeasibly high bar for achieving
autonomy, but also fails to capture the important role
that embodiment plays in shaping who we are. Insofar
as autonomy provides the Bmeans to our working out
our projects in the world,^ permitting us to realize our
goals and exercise our moral agency, the means and
opportunities to develop reflective capacities and to act
on these can be regarded as intrinsically valuable parts
of a fulfilling human existence (Young 1982, 43).
Therefore, being in a position to construct a coherent
narrative, which draws on knowledge of one’s own
biology for its constituent elements and the evaluations
we apply to these, is something that supports autonomy
and thus contributes to the meaning and richness of
one’s life.
Whilst there is indeed a close connection between
the construction of an intelligible self-narrative and
autonomy, this chiefly pertains to autonomy under-
stood in a thick sense of a global capacity of a whole
person. Where autonomy is understood in a thinner
sense (one prevalent in many bioethical texts), as the
context-relative state of being appropriately equipped
to make a discrete practical choices or as synony-
mous with informed consent (O’Neill 2002), the util-
ity of personal bioinformation is reduced to nothing
more than its capacity to inform particular decisions.
Some of the value of the narrative contribution of
bioinformation, as proposed here, might indeed lie in
supporting practical decision-making. But the sug-
gestion is that its significance also extends far beyond
its imminent action-guiding potential and may indeed
endure despite not being applicable to any immediate
decisions.
The importance of a self-narrative informed by per-
sonal bioinformation is also not reducible solely to its
role in supporting autonomy. According to a conception
such as Gerald Dworkin’s, autonomy is significant be-
cause of the role it plays in personal agency. Autonomy
thus conceived should be seen as only one of the valu-
able capacities that is underpinned by a coherent self-
narrative. As Dworkin himself notes, B[a]utonomy is
important, but so is the capacity for sympathetic
identification with others, the capacity to reason pruden-
tially, or the virtue of integrity^ (1988, 32). The value of
a narrative that makes sense in the context of embodied
existence is located as much in its power to effect
changes in someone’s view of herself and of others—
her values, allegiances, and interpretive perspective up-
on the world which might never, or at least not neces-
sarily, lead to specific actions.
It should now be apparent that, on the account offered
here, the identity-value of personal bioinformation is not
just clinical utility under another name. It is not reduc-
ible merely to a quality that facilitates discrete, autono-
mous, health-related decisions. The identity-value of
bioinformation can obtain where clinical utility does
not, or in contexts where clinical choices do not arise.
However, neither is identity-value merely an alternative
to clinical identity. As previously mentioned, personal
utility is often invoked as an explanation of the value
that information might retain even when the criteria for
clinical utility are not met—where utility is rendered
instead in terms of softer health or well-being outcomes.
The present account of identity-value is importantly
distinct from such accounts of personal utility. The
argument offered here is that an individual’s identity-
related interests in bioinformation warrant ethical atten-
tion both alongside and independently of her clinical
and wider health interests.
Before moving on to consider the kinds of factors
that might influence whether particular instances of
bioinformation are useful for the purposes of self-con-
ception, I wish to head off one erroneous inference that
might be drawn from asserting the identity-value of
bioinformation in general: that this necessarily entails a
bio-essentialist view of identity. It does not.
Conceptions of personal identity as self-created are of-
ten contrasted with those in which it is seen as essential
(Marshall 2009; Nordgren and Juengst 2009). Accounts
that propose a significant role for knowledge of one’s
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biology are often assumed to fall in the latter camp,
where information is framed a means of discovering a
pre-existing essence. As such, they can be seen as
objectionable for denigrating the choices of those who
characterize themselves in ways that diverge from their
biology, for example, by identifying as transgender or
embracing their social family as their origins story.
However, as should be clear by now, on the account
offered here, personal bioinformation is not valuable
because it reveals who we already are but because (with
some provisos to which I shall return below) it provides
knowledge of our embodied states that is potentially
useful in developing who we are. Particular kinds of
bioinformation are not intrinsically identity-relevant, but
only insofar as they serve the ends of helping someone
to construct an articulable, intelligible, and realistic
self-narrative. It is not necessarily a threat to this
intelligibility if someone responds to the receipt of
bioinformation by (re)asserting their identification with
non-biological aspects of their lives such as their chosen
family or gender. Nothing in the present account entails
that bioinformation provides the only tools for a
coherent, comprehensible, and satisfying self-
conception; our narratives will inevitably also be
woven from strands that have nothing to do with our
biology.
Factors That Could Detract From, or Enhance,
Identity-Value
Attending to the reasons offered here for the potential
identity-value of personal bioinformation brings to light
two corollary factors that might impact upon the capac-
ity of information to provide truly useful narrative tools.
The first of these concerns the empirical robustness of
the information and its associated capacity to provide
relevant knowledge of our embodied states. The second
relates to the crucial part played by interpretive context
in how the information is received and utilized. Each of
these will be considered in turn below.
If the identity-value of personal bioinformation is
located in its capacity to help someone build a narrative
that is in tune with an embodied existence, then this has
one particularly important consequence when it comes
to assessing which kinds of information are suited to
fulfilling this role. I wish to suggest that personal
bioinformation will only provide a useful tool of identity
construction to the extent that it (including the context in
which it is conveyed—the importance of which is
unpacked further below) supports its subject-recipient
in forming reliable beliefs about the nature of her own
body, biology or health. This, I wish to suggest, means
that the bioinformation that contributes to our narratives
in useful ways must at least be empirically robust. This
may be seen as taking Schechtman’s reality constraint
one step further than she herself does, though with a
parallel justification. Schechtman’s reality constraint re-
quires that our narratives are reasonably consistent with
the world as experienced by others, because this is a
condition for our being able to function in social con-
texts (Schechtman 1996, 119). On the account devel-
oped here, our narratives need also to be reasonably
consistent with our biological reality, because only then
are they likely to support us effectively in making sense
of and navigating our experiences of embodied exis-
tence, and themselves remain intelligible in light of
these.
This need not entail a strongly realist attachment to
the scientific Btruth^ of all potentially valuable
bioinformation. It is sufficient that this information is
consistent with the phenomenological world, that it
leads the recipient to form beliefs about her body, health
and biological relationships amongst which, in Bas van
Fraassen’s phrase, her actual and potential experiences
can Bfind a home^ (van Fraassen 1980, 86). This is
because what matters is that personal bioinformation
provides the recipient with sufficiently reliable knowl-
edge and understanding of the past, present, or probable
future nature of her embodied state to fulfil the kinds of
explanatory, predictive, or descriptive functions de-
scribed above, such that she does not end up construct-
ing a self-narrative that grates against, ceases to make
sense, or causes her to stub her toes painfully when
confronted by the realities of her embodied existence.
In order to illustrate the dependence of the identity-
value of bioinformation upon its capacity to underpin
reliable beliefs, I will return to the example of psychiat-
ric neuroimaging research findings and the deferred
question of whether their potential positive narrative
contributions (as previously described) are likely to be
realized in practice. Despite the assumption hitherto
made for simplicity’s sake—that the kind of predictive
neuroimaging research findings discussed could
function as useful narrative tools in various ways—there
are several grounds for questioning this assumption.
First it might be objected that a fundamental obstacle
to their value is that knowledge of our brain functions is
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not the same as knowledge of mental illness or its
impact upon our own lives (Glannon 2009; Ramos
2012). Even if one does not subscribe to wholesale
scepticism about the role of the brain in mental illness,
one might nevertheless recognize that to understand
mental disorders we need to look not to the brain alone,
but to its interaction with its bodily, cultural, and social
environment—to the functions of what Walter Glannon
terms the Bembodied and embedded mind^ (2009, 321).
A related objection is that findings such as the outputs of
fMRI are just dry, disembodied biomedical data and as
such fail to capture the individual phenomenology of
illness and, therefore, are incapable of fulfilling the
kinds of descriptive or explanatory narrative roles which
would on the present account justify their identity sig-
nificance (Mazanderani, Locock, and Powell 2013).
However, the account of identity-value offered in the
previous sections does not rely on the claim that
bioinformation provides the complete story of some-
one’s experiences of embodiment and illness, with all
the personal nuances this entails. Neuroimaging find-
ings taken in isolation are indeed unlikely to equip
someone with everything she needs to construct an
identity capable of navigating the lived and felt realities
of mental ill-health, but this does not mean that they
could never be of use to her in helping to fill gaps, frame
experiences, or seed affiliations. Whether biomedical
findings are in fact too abstract or impersonal will, to a
considerable extent, depend on how they are conveyed
and the interpretative support provided as part of this. I
wish to suggest that the legitimacy of the above objec-
tions (excepting those premised on thoroughgoing scep-
ticism about the brain’s role in mental illness) can be
acknowledged without relinquishing the proposition
that information about brain function or structure could
provide valuable narrative tools.
Having said this, I would maintain that the possible
value of this instrumental, contributory role of neuroim-
aging findings in self-conception is not unassailable, but
contingent upon the reliability and predictive strength of
the information in question. The example discussed
above is more vulnerable to this second kind of concern
than the previous objections. There remain legitimate
reservations about the ability of current psychiatric neu-
roimaging techniques to provide robust, predictive find-
ings about an individual’s health. This is attributable to,
amongst other factors, a lack of standardisation in im-
aging methodologies (Farah and Gillihan 2012) and
doubts that current psychiatric diagnostic categories
align neatly with structural or functional neurological
biomarkers (Ramos 2012). There are related concerns
that results from psychiatric neuroimaging do not yet
tend to exhibit sufficient sensitivity (to differences be-
tween individuals’ brains) or specificity (to different
mental health conditions) (Farah and Gillihan 2012).
These kinds of limitations are manifest in the specific
study cited above, in which the incidence of false pos-
itive findings was around 25 per cent. This degree of
error, I would suggest, is material to our assessments of
the information’s potential identity-value.
The intention here is not to question the quality of the
methodology used in the study described. Rather, it is to
highlight that findings from psychiatric neuroimaging
research such as this will only contribute usefully to
narrative construction insofar as they are reliably pre-
dictive and explanatory of an individual participant’s
future risks of developing a depressive disorder. There
is little value, and perhaps even a real risk of harm, in
someone constructing and living-out an identity that
acknowledges, accommodates, and prepares for the on-
set of a serious depressive disorder if she is not in fact at
increased risk, or indeed in being falsely reassured if she
is at risk.7 While I have suggested that research partic-
ipants could have ethically relevant interests in (at least
being offered) access to individual research results as a
tool of identity construction, this interest is unlikely to
obtain when these results would not provide them with
useful insights into or understanding of the world in
order to construct a narrative that remains intelligible
as their experiences of the world unfold. Given the
relatively high incidence of false positives, which intro-
duces a level of uncertainty about whether any particular
participant has an elevated risk of developing depres-
sion, the policy of not disclosing individual research
results to participants in the study in question looks
sound, at least as far as protecting participants against
misleading identity impacts are concerned.
As previously noted, the example of psychiatric neu-
roimaging is useful in capturing both sides of the ac-
count of identity-value offered here, illustrating the po-
tential for biomedical research to generate information
that could be useful for constructing an intelligible story
of an embodied existence, while in practice still
7 For commentators inclined to wholesale scepticism about the
role of brain function in mental illness, concerns about the possible
harm, or at least disutility, of using neuroimaging findings to reify
increased susceptibility to depression within one’s self-conception
are likely to go even deeper.
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exhibiting features that constrain the actualization of this
kind of value. Concerns about the epistemic limits of
particular categories of bioinformation apply not only to
findings from pre-clinical research studies, which
inevitably involve some degree of uncertainty, but ex-
tend also to other contexts such as the outcomes of some
clinical tests for some genetic disease risks where the
results themselves are rendered in probabilistic terms
(Atkins and Panegyres 2011). The extent to which
bioinformation provides a Bgood enough^ chart of the
submerged trunks of someone’s embodied reality such
that it will provide a reliably useful tool for narrative
construction is clearly something that will admit of
degrees, depending on a number of factors including
the seriousness or significancewith which that particular
aspect of her health or biology is imbued. Some level of
uncertaintymay be inherent to the probabilistic nature of
the results currently achievable in particular biomedical
fields and (perhaps accompanied by appropriate
contextualisation and counselling) need not necessarily
obviate all identity-value.
However, it is worth noting that sound findings that
convey uncertainty about an individual’s future health
occupy one end of a spectrum, at the other end of which
are those which are frankly unsupported by evidence. If
the identity-value of results fromwell-conducted research
is questionable, then this doubt applies with even greater
force to results generated from, for example, poor or
inappropriate observational or analytical methods, or
overambitious extrapolations from observed data, as
may well be the case in some dubious DTC services
prematurely offering putatively Bdiagnostic^ neuroimag-
ing (Alpert 2012; Borgelt, Buchman, and Illes 2012), or
genetic ancestry testing (Royal et al. 2010). Concerns
about the disvalue, or actual harm, of disclosing empiri-
cally unsound information of these kinds would, I sug-
gest, extend even to circumstances in which the
information-subject herself really desires access to it.
It is important to recognize the scope of the claim
being made in this section. It is not that all empirically
robust personal bioinformation is relevant and of value
to its subject-recipient’s self-narrative, that will depend
as much on the story she wishes to tell about herself.
Empirical robustness, I wish to suggest, is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for identity-value. Some
commentators have suggested that a similar condition of
analytic or clinical validity should apply when recog-
nizing the personal utility of genomic test results or
research findings (Bunnik, Janssens, and Schermer
2015; Wolf et al. 2012). However, in those contexts it
is not always clear why the imposition of such condi-
tions is appropriate if the utility of the findings is indeed
personal. Here I hope to have provided an explanation
why at least one species of personal utility (its personal
nature notwithstanding) is conditional on the objective
criterion of empirical robustness.
The preceding discussion outlines the most funda-
mental factors influencing information’s identity-value,
but does not yet provide anything like a definitive an-
swer to the question of when personal bioinformation
should be disclosed to the individual to whom it per-
tains. Just because information is empirically robust
does not mean that the identity-related interests of the
individual(s) to whom it applies will automatically be
served by accessing it. It is important not to lose sight of
the possibility that, in some cases, receipt of
bioinformation could be disruptive rather than welcome.
New—particularly unexpected and unsought—
bioinformation might be distressing where it contradicts
valued aspects of the recipient’s existing narrative, for
example, as in some revelations of genetic parentage
(Kirkman 2003). Alternatively, as illustrated above, it
could feed biologically reductive self-conceptions to the
detriment of her quality of life, for example, by encour-
aging denigratory self-perceptions or a fatalistic passiv-
ity. This need not be taken as indicating the
identity-irrelevance of information received in these
ways (indeed it signals the importance of attending to
potential identity impacts of all shades when assessing
ethical disclosure practices) but it certainly signals a lack
of unequivocally positive identity impacts.
For example, tests currently available for detecting
the BRCA1 and BRAC2 genetic mutations offer clini-
cally valid results indicating that carriers of these muta-
tions have significantly increased lifetime risks of de-
veloping breast and ovarian cancer (albeit probabilistic
results rather than 100 per cent certainty).8 However,
simply knowing that these tests can accurately identify
an individual’s clinical status will not on its own tell
professionals whether disclosing results to the tested
individual will, on balance, have a positively
constructive impact on her self-conception. The relevant
8 For example, a previously unaffected woman who tests positive
for the BRCA1 gene mutation has a 60–90 per cent lifetime risk of
developing breast cancer (The Royal Marsden, NHS Foundation
Trust 2013).
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considerations that professionals responsible for infor-
mation disclosure would need to take into account in
deciding whether to provide access to personal
bioinformation on identity-related grounds are, first,
whether it would provide the individual with sufficiently
reliable knowledge of her aspects of biology or health to
enable her to navigate the lived reality of these aspects,
and second, whether there are reasons to anticipate that
the information would have significantly negative
impacts on her sense of self. While some individuals
may seek BRCA1/2 tests in order to be in a position to
take potentially protective measures and to gain some
understanding of and control over their future
experiences, others may eschew testing, fearing that
the results could threaten their existing narratives by,
for example, making them feel betrayed by their bodies
or changing the dynamics of their family relationships
(d’Agincourt-Canning 2006; Esplen et al. 2009).
Practical applications of the present account of
identity-significance in healthcare, screening, or re-
search contexts would need to take seriously the risks
associated with the possible negative identity-impacts of
disclosure. Yet professionals are unlikely to be able to
discern a prioriwhen the benefits of equipping someone
to develop a self-narrative that remains intelligible in
light of her experiences of biological Breality^might fail
to outweigh any accompanying risks of distress or un-
helpful bio-deterministic thinking in her particular case.
This is not, however, a challenge unique to consider-
ations of identity-value. Any recommendations regard-
ing the disclosure of findings that seek tomake space for
recognizing their personal utility, beyond the rigid and
objectively defined confines of clinical utility, are likely
to encounter similar problems in anticipating when new
knowledge would (not) be welcomed by an individual.
These considerations suggest that there will rarely be
circumstances in which the unexpected imposition of
unsought information would be justified on the grounds
of furthering someone else’s project of self-conception.
Indeed, they would counsel a cautious and attentive
approach even where the information is sought by the
individual, so as to ensure (as far as possible) that it is
received in a way that enables her to appreciate its
epistemic limits, and averts the kinds of interpretations
that could be corrosive to a resilient or coherent sense of
self. Such nuanced judgements about identity impacts
do not have to be made, and indeed cannot be reached,
in abstract. In practice, professionals would need to
attend to individual-specific factors determining how
the information would be received, such as the recipi-
ent’s personal values and circumstances and her capac-
ities to take in, understand, and perhaps act upon what
she is being told.While this could be resource-intensive,
the professional responsibilities implied—to work to a
greater extent in partnership with the patient or research
participant—are in step with contemporary recommen-
dations regarding informed consent in clinical and re-
search settings. In that context it is increasingly common
to encounter arguments that patients’ and participants’
consent should be a supported, relational, longitudinal
process, reached in partnership with professionals, rath-
er than a discrete one-off event (Laurie and Postan 2013;
Maclean 2009). In the case of BRCA1/2 testing, this
relational process could draw upon existing
Bself-concept^ impact tools that could assist practi-
tioners in delivering care that takes into account the
possible effects on an individual’s sense of identity
(Esplen et al. 2009).
The possibility of adopting these kinds of more in-
teractive and insight-driven approaches notwithstand-
ing, attending to identity-related interests will not elim-
inate familiar challenges arising from, inter alia, how to
balance the tested individual’s identity interests against
competing interests (for example those of blood-
relatives whose own carrier status could be revealed),
or how to manage the so-called Bright not to know.^
However, looking beyond the traditional concerns with
autonomy and privacy, and taking into account identity
interests, could help to shine fresh light into the nature of
the values potentially at work in these hoary dilemmas.
For example, Graeme Laurie suggests that the right not
to know genetic information about oneself may be
construed in terms of the interest in protecting one’s
spatial privacy (Laurie 2002). Recognizing the
potential identity-significance of genetic test results
illuminates what might be seen as a key aspect of
the value of spatial privacy: the protection of an
environment in which an individual can construct
her own self-narrative without unsought and unwelcome
constraints.
To a great extent, however, few of us are free to
construct our own self-stories entirely on our own
terms. This is due in part to the fact that the perceived
iden t i t y -va lue o f pa r t i cu la r ca t ego r i e s o f
bioinformation is perhaps inevitably shaped by the
kinds of accounts that prevail in the cultural and
interpretive communities to which we belong.
Social scientists have noted the pervasiveness of
146 Bioethical Inquiry (2016) 13:133–151
neuro-explanations amongst contemporary popular
accounts of why we are who we are (Choudhury,
Nagel, and Slaby 2009; Rose and Abi-Rached
2013). The abilities of neuroimaging, perhaps partic-
ularly fMRI, to provide direct insights into our iden-
tities are often subject to considerable levels of over-
simplification and hyperbole when, for example, re-
ported in non-specialist media or used by DTC neu-
roimaging companies in their marketing materials
(Racine, Bar-Ilan, and Illes 2005; Racine, van der
Loos, and Illes 2007).9 While such misrepresenta-
tions need not necessarily detract from the utility of
more robust neuro-findings as narrative tools, it does
point to the possible need to temper perceptions of
their significance, particularly where (as suggested
above) neuro-essentialist interpretations could be
counter-therapeutic. Each of the concerns sketched
above—from the risk of reductionist conflation of
representations of our brain functions with our men-
tal states, to doubts about the sensitivity of psychiat-
ric research results, and awareness of the influence of
hyperbolic claims about the capacities of particular
kinds of bioinformation to provide insights into who
we are—usefully highlight how important it is likely
to be for those responsible for disclosure of personal
bioinformation also to provide context for this infor-
mation. That is, to provide context that helps the
recipient herself to appreciate the possible limitations
of particular findings or results as useful means of
self-conception. This brings the discussion to one
final important factor that could influence the poten-
tial identity-value of personal bioinformation. It is
crucial to recognize that the utilization of information
about our biology and health in our self-narratives is
an interpretive undertaking and, furthermore, that
information itself is not a discrete, inert entity that
remains unchanged from one transaction to the next,
but rather acquires its meaning and significance from
the contexts in which it is conveyed and interpreted
(Taylor 2012).
The malleability of the meaning and utility of infor-
mation is particularly significant given that, as illustrat-
ed above, it is not inevitable that all the impacts of
receiving bioinformation affect our identities in positive
ways. This introduces important opportunities for, and
indeed responsibilities upon, the professionals tasked
with disclosure to take steps to support constructive,
and minimize reductive or distressing, interpretations
by those to whom they disclose. These could include,
for example, explaining the limits of a research find-
ing’s predictive or explanatory capacities, contextualiz-
ing test results for disease susceptibility with statistics
on population-wide incidence, or providing links to
patient support groups. It will also mean attending to
exactly what kind and extent of information would best
meet the explanatory, predictive, (re)descriptive or
relationship-building ends of effective narrative tools.
For example, it will be important to ask whether a
donor-conceived individual’s identity-related interest
in Bknowing her genetic origins^ will be adequately
met by basic information about her gamete donor’s
name, or whether it would also include the means of
contacting the donor, or whether it is the story of her
parents’ family-making choices that really matter to her
(Blauwhoff 2008; Ravelingien, Provoost, and Pennings
2015). Although, up to this point, the present discussion
has been framed in terms of the identity-value or dis-
closure of Bthe^ personal bioinformation, it is plain that
that which is valuable is not a neatly bounded package,
but something that extends into the manner and context
of its transmission to the individual. Questions about
the Bwhat^ and the Bhow^ of disclosure are, therefore,
just as important as the Bwhether.^
Similar concerns about the need to contextualize
bioinformation to avoid misconstrual are regularly
raised in relation to the return of results from DTC
genomic testing services without the intercession of
advice from a suitably qualified clinician (Nuffield
Council on Bioethics 2010). The present context, how-
ever, differs in a key way from those in which it is
clinical utility of findings that requires contextualizing.
While biomedical professionals who generate or dis-
close personal bioinformation may have the appropriate
expertise to interpret its clinical validity, we might ques-
tion the limits of their legitimate epistemic authority to
interpret and help determine matters of its identity-sig-
nificance. Here the worry is not merely that, in contrast
to their clinical skills, these professionals might be ill-
equipped to anticipate or support subjects’ identity in-
terests. Instead, the concern is that despite this deficit
they are nevertheless in a position to exercise dispropor-
tionate influence on how we define ourselves by shap-
ing the availability, meaning, and perceived significance
9 This is not necessarily a wholly new phenomenon, Borck notes
the enthusiasm with which the Belectric epistemology^ of electro-
encephalography (EEG) was embraced in Weimar Germany
(Borck 2001, abstract).
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of the informational tools that are available for this task.
This could operate at the level of the individual disclo-
sure, in which a specific type of bioinformation, such as
a disease diagnosis, is communicated in a fashion that
emphasizes the gravity of its personal significance. It
could also operate at a broader level through activities
that contribute to shaping community-wide norms relat-
ing to the perceived relevance of a category of informa-
tion as a mode of self-identification (Butler 2005), as in
the current fevered environment in which neuro-
explanations for all manner of human experiences are
popular currency (O’Connor, Rees, and Joffe 2012).
Either of these kinds of interpretive-loading could be
seen as foreclosing an individual’s own perception of
which bioinformation is (not) relevant to her identity.
To some extent the potential for external interpretive
influences upon our perceptions of identity-significance
is an inevitable (and not necessarily malign) conse-
quence of the fact that we construct our self-narratives
within communities and traditions, influenced by the
ways that others define us (Hauskeller, Sturdy, and
Tutton 2013; MacIntyre 1985). Furthermore, it would
be a mistake to regard the individual as passive in this
respect. As Hacking observes, by identifying with and
living with a particular mode of self-identification, indi-
viduals themselves are active in shaping its meaning and
scope (Hacking 1995). Nevertheless, there is, undoubt-
edly, a delicate balance to be struck in equipping those
who gene r a t e and commun i c a t e pe r sona l
bioinformation as part of their professional roles to do
so in ways that are supportive of the kind of identity-
development that enhances rather than undermines well-
being, without thereby ceding to them too great an
influence over determinations of identity-significance,
when it is properly the subject not the producer of the
information who should decide what story she wishes to
tell about who she is.
Concluding Remarks
Discussions of the personal utility and identity-impacts of
findings generated in healthcare, screening services, and
research are increasingly in evidence in the bioethical
literature. However, often lacking from these discussions
is a clear analysis of the basis of the personal or identity-
significance of this kind of information. If these discus-
sions are to have useful practical application, it is impor-
tant to be able to characterize the nature of the value in
question, because only then can we assess the nature,
scope, and weight of the personal interests involved.
It has been suggested here that one aspect of the
personal value of bioinformation may be explained in
terms of the role it could play as a predictive, explana-
tory, descriptive, or relational tool in an individual’s
construction of the narrative that constitutes her identity.
The instrumental, rather than essential, nature of the
potential contribution of bioinformation to identity
should not, however, be taken as an indication of its
triviality or dispensability. On the contrary, because of
the inescapably embodied nature of our existence, per-
sonal bioinformation supports our capacities to con-
struct identities that permit us to make sense of and
navigate our experiences of this kind of existence and
to remain intelligible in light of these. Moreover, be-
cause the construction of an intelligible self-narrative
plays a central role in an individual’s identity as a social
actor and moral agent, factors that impinge upon her
capacity to undertake this construction engage her inter-
ests in ethically considerable ways—hence the factors
determining her (in)access to and interpretations of the
kinds of bioinformation that could fulfil this role are
themselves ethically significant.
The instrumental role of bioinformation in our self-
narratives helps to explain both its value and the kinds of
factors that might undermine or enhance this value.
However, individual preferences, dispositions, or capac-
ities that might contribute to determining whether par-
ticular informational transactions will fulfil this role in
positive ways present practical challenges to anticipat-
ing when and how information disclosure would be of
unequivocal benefit to a particular individual. The ac-
count offered here does not pretend to provide answers
to all the practical challenges that might accompany
decisions about information disclosure. However, what
it aims to have done is to make a case that the identity-
value warrants serious ethical attention, alongside con-
siderations of clinical and personal utility, in the context
of governing access to personal bioinformation generat-
ed in healthcare, health research, screening, and assisted
reproductive services.
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